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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 10, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed 
the conviction of Lemon Johnson and remanded the case for a new 
trial.1 Johnson had been convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon 
and possession of marijuana. The illicit items were discovered when 
police conducted a protective pat-down search of Johnson, who was a 
passenger in a car that was detained in a routine traffic stop.2 Johnson 
argued, inter alia, that his conviction should have been reversed 
because the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress 
the evidence.3 Specifically, he argued that he was unlawfully “seized” 
because a routine traffic stop does not automatically seize passengers 
and, in absence of this seizure, that Officer Trevizo did not have an 
articulable basis upon which to seize him. Alternatively, he argued 
that even if he had been seized, by the time he was searched, the 
limited-duration Terry-stop had become a consensual encounter in 
which Officer Trevizo would have needed an independent articulable 
basis to search him. Thus, according to Johnson, the search violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence discovered during 
that search should have been suppressed.4 
Though a recent and unrelated United States Supreme Court case 
settled the question of seizure,5 the Arizona Court of Appeals held 
that “when an officer initiates an investigative encounter with a 
 
 *  2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. State v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 668, 674 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 2. Id. at 669. 
 3. Id. at 668. 
 4. Id. at 671. 
 5. Id. (citing Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2007)). 
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passenger that was consensual and wholly unconnected to the original 
purposes of the routine traffic stop of the driver, that officer may not 
conduct a Terry frisk of the passenger without reasonable cause to 
believe ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’”6 On June 23, 2008, the 
United States Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari.7 
II.  FACTS 
At 9:00 p.m. on April 19, 2002, three Oro Valley police officers, 
including Officer Maria Trevizo, were on patrol near Sugar Hill, an 
area of Tucson associated with the Crips street gang.8 While routinely 
running the license plates of vehicles in the area, the officers stopped 
a car that had a mandatory insurance suspension.9 As she approached 
the vehicle, Officer Trevizo noticed that the occupant of the back seat, 
Johnson, was exhibiting unusual behavior.10 First, she observed that he 
had a police scanner in his jacket, which she felt was an unusual thing 
for somebody to be carrying.11 Additionally, she noticed that Johnson 
was wearing all blue,12 the chosen color of the Crips.13 These factors, 
combined with the fact that Johnson stated that he did not have any 
identification and had been convicted of a felony, led Officer Trevizo 
to suspect that Johnson may have been a gang member.14 
Johnson’s possible gang affiliation disconcerted Officer Trevizo 
because, due to her extensive training as a gang task force officer, she 
knew that gang members generally tend to possess firearms.15 Though 
she was concerned for her safety, Officer Trevizo did not have any 
indication that “Johnson was engaged in . . . or about to engage in 
criminal activity.”16 One of the officers then ordered all of the 
individuals in the car to display their hands.17 Additionally, one of the 
 
 6. Id. at 674 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
 7. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (U.S. June 23, 2008) (No. 07-1122). 
 8. Johnson, 170 P.3d at 668. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 669. Particularly, Johnson was alternately watching the officers as they 
approached and making comments to his friends in the front seats, something that struck 
Officer Trevizo as unusual. 
 11. Joint Appendix at 16, Johnson, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (No. 07-1122). 
 12. Id. at 17. 
 13. Id. at 18. 
 14. Id. at 19. 
 15. Id. at 10. 
 16. Id. at 29. 
 17. State v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
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officers ordered the driver to exit the vehicle and gathered 
information from him.18 
While her colleague dealt with the driver, Officer Trevizo 
questioned Johnson as he sat in the rear seat of the car.19 Because he 
exhibited signs of gang affiliation, Officer Trevizo hoped that Johnson 
could provide some information that would help the gang task force 
in combating criminal gang activities.20 At some point during the 
dialogue, Officer Trevizo asked Johnson to exit the vehicle so that she 
and Johnson would not be overheard by the other passenger.21 
Because she suspected that Johnson might have been armed and thus 
posed a threat to the safety of the officers, Officer Trevizo told 
Johnson after he exited the car that she was going to pat him down to 
make sure that he had no weapons.22 She then conducted the 
contested search.23 When the pat-down search revealed that Johnson 
had a handgun, he began to struggle and Officer Trevizo subdued and 
handcuffed him.24 Johnson was promptly disarmed and taken into 
custody. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
All cases in this discrete line of constitutional jurisprudence fall 
under the umbrella of Terry v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court held 
that a police officer may stop a person if he reasonably suspects that 
the person has committed or is in the process of committing a crime.25 
Under Terry, a person is seized when, “by means of physical force or 
show of authority,”26 police action “terminates or restrains his freedom 
of movement.”27 Once the officer makes a seizure, he may then 
conduct a pat-down search to ensure that the suspect is not armed 
and to preserve evidence.28 
As law enforcement officials have attempted to constitutionally 
apply this concept, subsequent cases have further illuminated when 
 
 18. Id. at 669. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 19. 
 21. Johnson, 170 P.3d at 669. 
 22. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 20. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 24. 
 25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 26. Id. at 19 n.16. 
 27. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). 
 28. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 
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seizures occur and who may be seized. As articulated by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Mendenhall, a person has been seized if “in 
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”29 Delaware v. Prouse made clear that during a traffic stop, the 
driver of the vehicle is lawfully seized30 and, in Brendlin v. California, 
the Supreme Court unanimously voted to adhere to previous dicta, 
formally expanding the scope of the seizure to include passengers of 
the vehicle.31 
A.  Recent Supreme Court Cases 
Brendlin and Knowles v. Iowa are two recent Supreme Court cases 
that are instructive in applying the Terry doctrine to the Johnson case. 
As mentioned, Brendlin held that a traffic stop seizes passengers of 
the vehicle in addition to the driver. In Knowles, the Supreme Court 
disallowed full “field-type” searches in the context of traffic stops but 
stated that police may order a driver and passengers from the vehicle 
and conduct pat-down searches “upon reasonable suspicion that they 
may be armed and dangerous.”32 
In Brendlin, police stopped a vehicle with expired registration and 
an ostensibly legitimate temporary registration (issued while an 
application for renewal was pending) in order to verify that the 
permit matched the vehicle.33 While the driver spoke with the police, 
one of the officers noticed that the driver’s passenger was one of the 
“Brendlin brothers,” one of whom was in violation of his parole.34 
When the police discovered that the passenger was indeed the 
wayward brother, he was arrested.35 A search incident to arrest 
revealed methamphetamine and equipment commonly used to 
manufacture the drug.36 
At the trial hearing to suppress the evidence uncovered by the 
search, Brendlin unsuccessfully argued that he was unlawfully seized 
 
 29. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 545 (1980). 
 30. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1979). 
 31. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2007). 
 32. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1998). 
 33. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (2007). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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as a result of the traffic stop.37 The California Court of Appeals held 
that the traffic stop effectively seized Brendlin and, because the stop 
itself was unlawful, the court reversed the denial of Brendlin’s motion 
to suppress.38 The California Supreme Court reversed, invoking the 
concepts of power and authority articulated in Terry and stating that a 
passenger cannot meaningfully submit to police authority and 
therefore cannot be seized in a traffic stop.39 Instead, the California 
Supreme Court of California held that a passenger is seized only if the 
stop is accompanied by some additional facts that would indicate that 
the passenger was not free to go and was subject to the control of the 
police.40 
The Brendlin case gave the United States Supreme Court occasion 
to consider whether police, in executing a traffic stop, seize persons 
who are passengers within the stopped vehicle.41 In light of Terry and 
its progeny, the Court framed the analysis as “whether a reasonable 
person in Brendlin’s position when the car stopped would have 
believed himself free to terminate the encounter between the police 
and himself.”42 
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Souter explained that 
the general public would not expect the police to distinguish between 
the driver and the passenger during a traffic stop.43 The Court pointed 
to a number of cases that support this view, emphasizing that the 
intentional application of governmental control and the perception of 
the persons seized were the most important factors for evaluation 
rather than the subjective intent of the officer to stop the driver and 
his ambivalence toward the passengers at the time of the stop.44 
Additionally, the Court noted that, as opposed to the obvious seizure 
that occurs when a fleeing suspect is physically restrained, a stationary 
 
 37. Id. The trial court determined that he was seized only when the police officer ordered 
him out of the car immediately prior to his arrest. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2404–05. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2403. 
 42. Id. at 2405–06 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 43. Id. at 2407 (“If the likely wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will reasonably 
feel subject to suspicion owing to close association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad 
driving, the passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the 
scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer than no passenger 
would feel free to leave in the first place.”). 
 44. Id. at 2407–08. 
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suspect may submit to seizure merely by staying where he is.45 As a 
result, the Court held that police had effectively seized Brendlin when 
they stopped the car, despite the fact that he was merely a passenger 
and not the target of the stop itself 46 
The Knowles case evaluated an Iowa law that gave officers the 
option to issue citations for traffic violations or to arrest offending 
drivers and bring them before magistrates for further proceedings.47 
As interpreted by the Iowa Supreme Court, this statutory option 
authorized police to conduct a “search incident to citation” if they 
decided to cite rather than to arrest offenders.48 In Knowles, an Iowa 
police officer stopped a motorist and cited him for speeding.49 After 
issuing the citation, the officer proceeded to conduct a full “field-
type”50 search of the automobile.51 In the course of his search, the 
officer discovered marijuana and a pipe, presumably used to smoke 
the marijuana.52 The officer arrested the motorist for violation of 
Iowa’s controlled substances laws.53 
Before trial, the motorist unsuccessfully moved to suppress the 
evidence and was subsequently convicted.54 On appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court analyzed the justifications articulated in United 
States v. Robinson55 for the sort of full “field-type” exploratory search 
performed here.56 The Court invoked the dual concerns of officer 
safety and of the need to preserve evidence in the context of a lawful 
arrest, and then proceeded to explore the factual similarities between 
an arrest and a traffic stop.57 The Court explained that a traffic stop is 
more closely related to a traditional Terry stop than to a full arrest 
because the “proximity, stress, and uncertainty” that make arrest so 
dangerous are not as prevalent in the context of a traffic stop.58 As a 
result, the Court held that these traditional concerns do not, by 
 
 45. Id. at 2408. 
 46. Id. at 2410. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 115–116. 
 49. Id. at 114. 
 50. This type of search would encompass the entire automobile, which makes it more 
expansive than a Terry search. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 114–15. 
 54. Id. at 114. 
 55. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973). 
 56. Id. at 116–17. 
 57. Id. at 117. 
 58. Id. 
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themselves, permit police to conduct full investigatory searches during 
traffic stops.59 
Citing Terry, however, the Court then explained that this still left 
police officers with several procedures with which to preserve their 
safety. At the top of a laundry list of possible protections available to 
police officers during a routine traffic stop, the Court explicitly 
suggested that an officer may order both the driver and his passengers 
out of the car and may conduct pat-down searches of all parties “upon 
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.”60 
B.  Arizona Cases 
In addition to the Supreme Court cases above, the Arizona Court 
of Appeals also relied heavily upon two Arizona cases, In re Ilono H.61 
and State v. Navarro,62 during its analysis of the Johnson case. In both 
cases, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined that the searches 
were unconstitutional because they occurred during consensual 
encounters between law enforcement officials and civilians. Ilono H. 
held that officers cannot lawfully conduct a protective pat-down 
search in the context of a consensual encounter63 and Navarro yielded 
the proposition that a legitimate Terry stop may become a consensual 
encounter.64 
In Ilono H., two officers approached five individuals in a park that 
had a reputation for drug activity.65 They noted that many of the 
individuals were dressed in baggy red clothing, a color associated with 
gang activity,66 which caused the officers concern because, as one of 
the officers later testified, gang members often carry weapons.67 
Following a short dialogue, the officers conducted pat-down searches 
of the five individuals, found that Ilono was concealing a 40-ounce 
beer in his clothes, and arrested him for illegal possession of alcohol.68 
While conducting a search incident to the arrest, the officers found 
 
 59. Id. at 118–19. 
 60. Id. at 117–18. 
 61. In re Ilono H., 113 P.3d 696 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 62. State v. Navarro, 34 P.3d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
 63. Ilono H., 113 P.3d at 699. 
 64. Navarro, 34 P.3d at 297. 
 65. Ilono H., 113 P.3d at 697. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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cocaine in one of Ilono’s pockets.69 The juvenile court rejected Ilono’s 
claim that the search was impermissible under Terry and declined to 
suppress the cocaine evidence.70 Ilono, after his conviction, appealed.71 
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals established first that a 
Terry stop is permissible only when officers have reasonable suspicion 
that the person is or will shortly be engaged in criminal activity.72 The 
court contrasted this Terry stop with a consensual encounter, which an 
officer may initiate at any time but is subject to termination at the will 
of the person detained.73 From these two propositions, the court 
reasoned that it would be illogical to suggest that a person who could 
not be lawfully detained could still be subjected to a pat-down search 
during a consensual encounter.74 This is in keeping with the court’s 
earlier articulation of the proposition that “an officer’s right to 
conduct a pat-down search should be predicated on the officer’s right 
to initiate an investigatory stop in the first instance.”75 The court held 
that the officers had no right to initiate an investigatory stop because 
they had no reasonable suspicion that Ilono had committed a crime.76 
Because they had no right to stop Ilono, the officers therefore had no 
right to conduct a pat-down search during the consensual encounter.77 
In Navarro, police stopped a car near the scene of a shooting that 
had taken place a few hours earlier.78 One occupant of the car, 
Navarro, a thin Hispanic man in a red shirt and jeans, matched the 
description of the shooter and was handcuffed and questioned by 
police.79 After a brief discussion, Navarro was relieved of his 
handcuffs and asked to accompany an officer to the police station.80 
Navarro was never cited for anything and was never told that he was 
free to go; however, he also never expressed a desire to leave.81 The 
officer invited the unrestrained youth to sit in the front passenger seat 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 698. 
 74. Id. at 700. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 700–01. 
 77. Id. 
 78. State v. Navarro, 34 P.3d 971, 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. It is unclear whether the police removed the handcuffs before, during, or after 
Navarro decided to go to the station with the officer. 
 81. Id. 
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of his unmarked car, suggesting that he buckle his seat belt. When 
they got to the police station, the officer left Navarro unattended in 
the interrogation room while he left to buy Navarro a drink.82 Navarro 
agreed to be photographed and fingerprinted and to have his 
testimony taped.83 Navarro acknowledged that he was aware of his 
Miranda rights and signed consent forms to permit the use of his 
testimony.84 This information was later used to convict Navarro, who 
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it 
was illegally obtained.85 
On appeal, Navarro contended that his legal detention for 
investigatory purposes became an illegal arrest when the police took 
him to the station and that his compliance with officers’ requests 
exhibited an acceptance of his fate, not consent to the investigation.86 
The court disagreed with both contentions, and held that Navarro was 
neither in custody nor under arrest when he decided to accompany 
the officer to the police station because “[u]nder the circumstances, a 
reasonable, innocent person would have felt free to decline [the 
officer]’s request to accompany him for questioning downtown.”87 As 
a result, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s determination 
that the information obtained during the interrogation should not be 
suppressed.88 
IV.  HOLDING 
In State v. Johnson, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the 
evidence found during Officer Trevizo’s search of Johnson should be 
suppressed and the case remanded for a new trial.89 The court stated 
that Johnson was initially seized when police lawfully stopped the car 
in which he was riding.90 Though Officer Trevizo could have ordered 
all passengers from the vehicle at that time, she failed to do so.91 The 
lapse in time between the stop and the actual exercise of police 
authority over Johnson is especially important because, combined 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 973–74. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 972. 
 86. Id. at 974–75. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 977. 
 89. Id. at 674. 
 90. Id. at 671. 
 91. Id. at 672. 
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with Officer Trevizo’s polite and unthreatening manner, it caused a 
lawful Terry stop to transition into a consensual stop.92 Additionally, 
Officer Trevizo did not have an articulable basis upon which to 
suspect that Johnson was committing or had committed a crime and 
so she could not have justifiably initiated a Terry stop.93 Trevizo and 
Johnson were thus engaged in a consensual encounter that Johnson 
was free to terminate at any time, and in such a consensual situation 
Trevizo could not lawfully conduct a search of Johnson without his 
consent.94 Therefore, when Officer Trevizo conducted a protective pat-
down search and uncovered a firearm, she violated Johnson’s Fourth 
Amendment rights and triggered the exclusionary rule.95 
In State v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals of Arizona first 
explained the Terry v. Ohio framework as it was presented in In re 
Ilono H.96 In detailing the pertinent facts of that case, the court 
stressed that, although a lawful investigatory Terry stop allows officers 
to conduct a pat-down search to ensure officer safety, a consensual 
stop does not.97 The court pointed out that Ilono H. had reaffirmed 
that the validity of a protective search rests upon the validity of the 
initial stop.98 
Drawing on the Supreme Court’s holding in Brendlin v. California, 
the court agreed that Johnson had been lawfully seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the car in which he was a 
passenger was lawfully stopped.99 The court then evaluated Johnson’s 
claim that, even if he had been lawfully seized, Officer Trevizo was not 
entitled to conduct a protective pat-down search because the 
interaction “had evolved into a consensual encounter before Trevizo 
patted him down.”100 In evaluating this claim, the court first 
considered the circumstances under which a custodial detention 
becomes a consensual encounter. The court cited a number of cases 
suggesting that a traffic stop becomes a consensual encounter when 
an officer hands the driver his license and registration and issues him 
 
 92. Id. at 673. 
 93. Id. at 672. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 674. 
 96. State v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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a citation or warning.101 Although the court found no case law 
establishing such a point regarding passengers, it reasoned that, at 
some point, a passenger must be free to walk away from the scene of 
the traffic stop.102 In deciding exactly when this change of 
circumstances occurs, the court stated that it was compelled to apply a 
standard of reasonableness.103 
Proceeding with a more in-depth analysis, the court then 
elaborated on consensual encounters, stating that an encounter is 
consensual if a civilian voluntarily cooperates with police, absent 
coercive use or threat of power.104 On the other hand, an encounter is 
not consensual if a reasonable person would not feel free to disregard 
law enforcement officials and carry on as he otherwise would.105 
Applying these principles to the facts presented in Johnson, the court 
noted that Officer Trevizo’s purpose in speaking with Johnson was 
unrelated to the traffic stop.106 The court also emphasized that Officer 
Trevizo believed that Johnson was free to terminate the encounter at 
any time.107 After acknowledging that the subjective belief of an 
officer is only instructive if the officer communicates it to the civilian 
in some way, the court pointed out that Officer Trevizo did not 
communicate “to him [Johnson] that his encounter with her was 
anything other than consensual.”108 
The court next examined State v. Navarro and compared the facts 
in that case to those in Johnson.109 After deciding that Navarro had 
been subject to a greater level of coercion than had Johnson, the court 
held that the encounter was consensual because the reasonable 
person, in Johnson’s position, would have believed himself free to 
remain in the vehicle.110 Because it found that the encounter was 
consensual, the Arizona Court of Appeals held any evidence found 
during Officer Trevizo’s search should be suppressed.111 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 672. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 672–73. 
 110. Id. at 673. 
 111. Id. at 674. 
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Judge Philip Espinosa argued in dissent that the majority had not 
only disregarded settled law but had also placed police in greater 
peril.112 The dissent pointed to language in Ilono H. that stated that 
the lawful nature of a pat-down search should rest upon the legality of 
the original Terry stop.113 Because Johnson was lawfully seized as a 
result of the traffic stop, the dissent argued that the trial court’s 
decision was correct.114 Furthermore, the dissent stated that Arizona 
courts have long recognized that the right of an Arizona police officer 
to conduct a protective pat-down search of a passenger of a stopped 
vehicle comes from a “reasonable concern for his safety.”115 During 
the course of a lawful traffic stop, once Officer Trevizo reasonably 
believed that Johnson was armed and could pose a threat, she was 
justified in conducting a protective pat-down search for the weapon 
that she found.116 Because of these factors, the dissent concluded that 
the pat-down search was lawful and that the evidence should not be 
suppressed. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The adjudication of this case necessarily requires the balancing of 
extremely weighty interests. The Fourth Amendment is critical to 
protecting the right of a person to avoid unreasonable governmental 
intrusion into his life. Johnson’s claim draws on this ideal, which 
resonates with fundamental ideals of individualism and privacy but 
which conflicts with the concern for the safety of the men and women 
who protect citizens from criminals. As a result, rather than interpret 
the Fourth Amendment to flatly prohibit warrantless searches, the 
Supreme Court has made the warrant requirement a general rule, but 
one that has a number of exceptions. In Terry v. Ohio and its progeny, 
the Supreme Court has continued to invoke safety interests to 
construct a suitable framework that will concurrently protect law 
enforcement officials from dangerous criminals and innocent civilians 
from unreasonable governmental interference. 
In Johnson, the Arizona Court of Appeals has produced a 
standard that, in addition to being highly attenuated and practically 
unworkable, disrupts the delicate balance that the Supreme Court has 
 
 112. Id. at 674 (Espinosa, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (quoting State v. Riley, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 116. Id. 
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been carefully crafting for decades. Although the Supreme Court has 
not explicitly held that passengers may be ordered out of a lawfully 
stopped vehicle and subjected to protective pat-down searches if 
police suspect that they are armed and dangerous, it has stated in 
dicta that this and more is permissible.117 Additionally, in Brendlin v. 
California, the Supreme Court said of traffic seizures that “a sensible 
person would not expect a police officer to allow people to come and 
go freely from the physical focal point of an investigation.”118 By 
claiming to not reach this issue in Johnson, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals avoided contradicting Supreme Court dicta but propagated a 
rule that creates tension between the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and its own. 
If this outcome were the product of adherence to binding 
precedent or of applying clear and accepted constitutional principles, 
perhaps the Johnson case would be more understandable. The court, 
however, based its most crucial determinations upon an overly-
nuanced reading of the Navarro case, which is quite dissimilar from 
the Johnson case. 
First, the events in the Navarro case, which the Arizona court cited 
for the proposition that a custodial stop can transition into a 
consensual encounter, took place over a substantially long period of 
time.119 During that time, Navarro was accosted by police, led away 
from the vehicle for conversation, handcuffed but not given a 
protective pat-down search, and then was invited back to the police 
station, un-handcuffed, allowed to ride in the front passenger seat of 
the police officer’s vehicle, left unattended at the police station, and 
given a beverage.120 In that situation, the apparent shift in police 
interaction with the suspect is even more striking than the passage of 
hours between the original Terry stop and the termination of the 
police interaction. Thus, although the police initiated the encounter 
with Navarro in a clearly authoritarian manner, the subsequent 
removal of his handcuffs, a major symbol of police authority, could 
reasonably be understood to indicate an end to the compelled 
encounter. 
 
 117. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1998). 
 118. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2007). 
 119. Johnson, 170 P.3d at 676. 
 120. State v. Navarro, 34 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
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Second, the Navarro case did not present the danger, stress, and 
uncertainty that have long been considered crucial to the justification 
of protective pat-down searches.121 In contrast to the events of the 
Navarro case, the Johnson case presented a short traffic stop, 
conducted at night, involving multiple civilians displaying indicia of 
gang activity, and in which police interaction with civilians was 
consistent throughout the stop. 
To buttress its analysis in Johnson, the majority pointed to Officer 
Trevizo’s testimony that, in her opinion, Johnson was under no 
obligation to get out of the car and could have refused to exit the 
vehicle when instructed to do so. The court correctly articulated that 
an officer’s subjective intent is only relevant insofar as the officer 
communicates it, but it did not point to any of Officer Trevizo’s 
actions that would have communicated her subjective belief to 
Johnson. Instead, the court used a completely opposite rule; it shifted 
the burden to the state by assuming that the subjective intent was 
conveyed because Officer Trevizo did not act in a threatening or 
otherwise coercive manner. 
Contrary to the court’s assessment, the Joint Appendix indicated 
that Officer Trevizo’s interaction with Johnson, though polite and 
professional, was not consensual and was never suggested to be 
consensual. For example, although she did not use any physical 
force,122 Officer Trevizo said that she did not ask for Johnson’s 
permission to search him.123 It is equally clear that Johnson’s 
compliance is most accurately characterized as acquiescence. Johnson 
never expressed an unwillingness to comply,124 but it stands to reason 
that a man currently engaged in a felony would not interact with 
police to any degree beyond that to which he felt obliged.125 
Furthermore, Johnson contended that he had never consented, as 
indicated when defense counsel at the suppression hearing said: 
 
 121. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 111, 117 (1998). 
 122. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 50–51. 
 123. Id. at 34. 
 124. Id. at 49–51. 
 125. This is curiously at odds with a portion of the Supreme Court’s Terry jurisprudence, in 
which a significant number of cases have held that felons will often consensually interact with 
the police. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2002) (evidencing that 
felons do, in fact, cooperate with police in situations where they felt or should have felt free to 
terminate the encounter). 
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“There’s not consent here. The context is clearly not indicative of 
consent.”126 
It is fairly clear that the passage of time and the marked shift in 
police demeanor toward the civilian, sufficient to signal a transition 
into a consensual encounter in the Navarro case, are simply not 
analogous to the brief nature of the traffic stop and the polite but 
unquestioning demeanor of the officer in Johnson. Furthermore, the 
danger, stress, and uncertainty of the stop in the Johnson case suggest 
that police in that circumstance should be given greater leeway than 
the police in the Navarro case. If no communication was made to the 
civilian that the lawful stop had terminated,127 it is illogical to suggest 
that the passage of a few minutes or the use of a polite tone of voice 
would indicate to the passenger that he is free to ignore police 
requests or to walk away from the car and pursue his own destiny. As 
a result, the court should have agreed with Johnson’s original position: 
that the entire encounter between the police and Johnson was not 
consensual. This, however, would not help Johnson: without the initial 
Terry stop evolving into a consensual encounter, Officer Trevizo was 
justified in searching Johnson for her safety.128 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Supreme Court will probably reverse 
the holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was to suppress 
the evidence against Johnson. Given the unanimity of the Court in 
deciding Brendlin v. California and Knowles v. Iowa and its relatively 
undisturbed ideological composition, it seems very likely that the 
Court will continue this trend. Furthermore, as detailed above, the 
Court of Appeals’s decision was reached only through a number of 
novel determinations, any one of which the Supreme Court may 
reject, resulting in a reversal. For instance, the Supreme Court may 
hold that, in the context of a traffic stop, police may conduct 
protective pat-down searches of civilian occupants at any time. 
Alternatively, it may reject the notion that a consensual encounter 
may arise out of a lawful traffic stop or hold that, while possible, the 
 
 126. Id. at 52. 
 127. For instance, when an officer writes the driver a citation, hands him the citation and his 
license and registration, and tells him that he is free to leave. 
 128. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
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circumstances necessary for such a transition were not present in the 
Johnson case. 
The most reasonable disposition that the Court could adopt in 
reversing the Arizona Court of Appeals would be that a consensual 
stop may evolve from a valid Terry stop, but only under some 
combination of circumstances that are clearly indicative of a 
consensual interaction: the passage of a long period of time; a marked 
shift in police attitudes and interaction; and/or purposive 
communication to the civilian that he is free to go. Such a decision will 
continue to safeguard the rights of individual citizens while staunchly 
preserving the safety of the brave men and women who are sworn to 
protect and serve. 
